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A  multi-stage  technological  substitution  model  of  infrastructure-
dependent vehicle  technologies  is developed.  This  is  used  to
examine how  the allocation  of  public,  ﬁnancial  resources  to RD&D
support and  infrastructure  development  affects  the replacement  of
a locked-in  vehicle  technology  by more  sustainable  ones.  Although
consumers eventually  determine  which  vehicle  technology  will  be
successful, intervention  and  ﬁnancial  support  by public  agencies
can affect  the  technological  substitution  process.  Computer  sim-
ulations  provide  insights  into  the  trade-off  between  investing  in
RD&D, i.e.  the  creation  of new  technological  options  (variety),  and
investing in  infrastructure  development  for  these  technologies.  The
paper  ends  with  policy  recommendations.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. 
1. Introduction
The lock-in of society into a dominant technology is one of the main barriers to the diffusion of new
technologies (Unruh, 2000, 2002). This risk of lock-in is particularly high for infrastructure-dependent
vehicle technologies which are characterized by high infrastructure investment costs and the presence
of  network externalities, two mechanisms that make it difﬁcult to escape lock-in (Gómez-Ibán˜ez,
2003; Azar and Sandén, 2011). When the currently dominant technology is considered undesirable
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for society, governments may  implement policy measures to facilitate the escape from the existing
lock-in and the transition to a more sustainable technology.
The  substitution of a dominant, locked-in vehicle technology by a new vehicle technology can be
seen  as an evolutionary process characterized by variety creation and selection (Nelson and Winter,
1982; Dosi and Nelson, 1994). Policymakers that seek to inﬂuence technological change can apply
a  wide range of instruments. These may  stimulate investments in RD&D, for example, which lead to
increased  variety. Other measures such as favorable tax regimes, investment in new infrastructure and
carbon  pricing target the selection and diffusion process (van der Vooren and Alkemade, forthcoming).
The government or public regulator has to decide how to stimulate the different processes.
This problem is similar to the exploration versus exploitation dilemma in studies on organizational
strategy (March, 1991): First, the public budget for government intervention is limited. Second, the
technological substitution process is characterized by feedback mechanisms and intervention in one
part  of the process inﬂuences the success of intervention in other parts. Third, the optimal level of
technological variety is unknown. The literature indicates that the existence of technological diver-
sity  is a prerequisite for the escape of lock-in (Arthur, 1989; van den Bergh, 2008; Metcalfe, 1994).
However, while variety is necessary to escape lock-in, too much variety may  lead to increased con-
sumer  uncertainty and delayed adoption by end consumers. Furthermore, too much variety reduces
the  beneﬁts of increasing returns to scale for technology suppliers (Geroski, 2000). It is thus difﬁcult
to  decide upon an adequate level of variety, especially in situations where a limited budget for the
creation and (long term) support of technological options is available (van den Bergh et al., 2011).
Fourth, although innovations do tend to cluster in time and space (Freeman and Louc¸ ã, 2001), differ-
ent  technological alternatives may  enter the market at different moments, which makes it difﬁcult to
evaluate  the technological options.
The main research question that we will address in this paper is therefore: how does the alloca-
tion of public ﬁnancial resources to RD&D and infrastructure development affect the technological
substitution process of infrastructure-dependent vehicle technologies?
We  address this question by building an agent-based simulation model in which alternative vehi-
cle  technologies emerge that may  replace the dominant, unsustainable technology. The model allows
us  to compare and analyze the effects of different public resource allocations to low emission vehi-
cle  RD&D (variety creation) and infrastructure development (selection). The allocation of ﬁnancial
resources to variety creation, for example, through RD&D investments, may  lead to the emergence of
new  technological options. Financial resource allocation to infrastructure development, such as the
development of refuelling or recharging infrastructure in the case of vehicle technologies, is needed
to  support the market introduction of some of the new technological options.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the rel-
evant literature and the agent-based model of technological substitution of infrastructure-dependent
vehicle technologies is presented in Section 3. Next, Section 4 presents and interprets the results of
numerical simulations with the model. Section 5 offers an interpretation of the results in the context
of  sustainability transitions. Finally, Section 6 concludes and provides policy implications.
2.  Theoretical framework
The  substitution process of infrastructure-dependent vehicle technologies is a multi-stage process
(Knudsen and Levinthal, 2007). The process starts from a situation of lock-in and in the ﬁrst stage
the  creation of alternatives (technological variety) to the dominant design is supported with ﬁnancial
support for RD&D. In the second stage some of the new technologies receive government support for
infrastructure development before being subjected to market forces in the third stage, the stage of
consumer adoption. Below, we discuss the three stages of this technological substitution process in
more  detail, but we start with a discussion on lock-in.
2.1. Lock-in
A  dominant design refers to a technology that is the most successful on the market and becomes the
standard for future designs. The emergence of a dominant design is the result of the interplay between
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technical and market choices (Utterback, 1994). Often, dominant technologies emerge from the com-
petition  between a number of alternative technologies (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Anderson
and Tushman, 1990). For example, today’s dominant internal combustion engine vehicles competed
with electric- and steam-powered cars to succeed the old technology of horse-drawn carriages.
The determinants of lock-in can be found in path-dependent processes (David, 1985), which are
the  result of increasing returns to adoption (Unruh, 2000; Arthur, 1988), such as learning by using
(Rosenberg, 1982), scale economies, informational increasing returns, technological interrelatedness
(Frankel, 1955) and network externalities (Katz and Shapiro, 1985). The effects of these determi-
nants are even stronger when a technology depends on the availability of physical infrastructure.
Infrastructure-dependent vehicle technologies can be subject to both direct and indirect network
externalities (Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Koski and Kretschmer, 2004). Direct network externalities occur
when  a technology is valued more highly when the number of adopters increases. Indirect network
externalities occur when the availability of complementary goods increases with an increased number
of  users, thereby indirectly increasing the value of the technology. This is the case for cars that depend
on  the availability of fuel stations. Increasing returns to adoption for the old technology can hinder
the  diffusion of newer, possibly superior technologies (Arthur, 1988; Frenken et al., 2004).
A dominant technology forms the selection environment for the new technology. New technologies
initially often show higher prices and poor performance in comparison to the incumbent technol-
ogy (Rosenberg, 1976), and when these new technologies depend on the availability of a physical
infrastructure (that is incompatible with the existing infrastructure), overcoming lock-in is even more
difﬁcult.
2.2.  Stage 1: public support for RD&D
Although difﬁcult to overcome, history shows that lock-in is often a temporary phenomenon from
which escape is possible. Technology-push and demand-pull processes can give rise to new options or
inventions  that replace existing technologies (Dosi, 1982). Demand-pull processes occur when con-
sumer  preferences regarding technological performance change in response to dissatisfaction with the
current  (unsustainable) technological paradigm. Technology-push processes occur when, for example,
the  government supports a new technological option through adapted regulation or ﬁnancial support
for  RD&D.
Although it is very difﬁcult to determine ex ante which of the newly created technologies will
succeed in replacing the incumbent technology (Kemp et al., 1999), stimulating variety is often part of
policy  schemes that aim to replace the current dominant technology by a preferred alternative, like in
the  Dutch energy transition program (Smith and Kern, 2009; Kern and Howlett, 2009; Stirling, 2010).
Public  RD&D support in this ﬁrst, pre-market, stage offer actors a ﬁnancial compensation for their
exploratory efforts. Although, such support schemes sometimes already involve elements of selection,
this  paper considers public RD&D support as a contribution to technological variety (see, for example,
IEA  (2007), on pre-award/ex ante selection and Knudsen and Levinthal (2007) on alternative genera-
tion).  For policymakers, the question at this stage is what part of their total budget should be spent on
public  RD&D support in order to escape the existing lock-in (Stirling, 2010).
2.3. Stage 2: public support for infrastructure development
Governments can inﬂuence the rate and direction of technological change before infrastructure-
dependent vehicle technologies actually compete on the market. It is especially this stage between the
invention  of a new technology and its deployment in large scale pilot projects where many innovations
fail.  This phase is therefore sometimes called the ‘valley of death’ of technology development.
For infrastructure-dependent vehicle technologies, support often takes the form of subsidies to
install  (refuelling) infrastructure or the implementation of a price subsidy in order to decrease the
distance-to-market for the new technologies. Given the inherent uncertainty of the innovation process,
it  is difﬁcult to evaluate the different alternatives and to decide which and how many technological
options to support.
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2.4. Stage 3: consumer adoption
The  adoption of a technology by consumers is the ﬁnal stage of the technological substitution
process because consumers eventually determine which technology is diffused throughout the popu-
lation.  In this third stage, the different alternative options for the dominant design compete with each
other  and with the current locked-in dominant design (Arthur, 1988). On the market the main selection
criteria are the price of the technology and the degree to which the technological characteristics of the
new  technology ﬁt consumer preferences (including preferences for sustainability) (Lancaster, 1971).
For  infrastructure-dependent vehicle technologies, the availability of infrastructure is an important
factor in user preferences (Bunch et al., 1993; O’Garra et al., 2005).
This market selection environment is not static as consumer preferences evolve due to the availabil-
ity  of new technologies or due to exogenous forces that stress technological and service characteristics
that differ from the characteristics of the current dominant design. Consumers might, for example,
develop preferences for more sustainable vehicles or for vehicles with air-conditioning. Both the
incumbent technology and the new technological options may  beneﬁt from this changing selection
environment. When the incumbent technology successfully adapts to the changing environment this
is  called the “sailing ship” effect (Harley, 1973; Geels, 2002).
2.5.  The allocation problem
When  designing a policy scheme to support low emission vehicles policymakers have to decide
how to allocate public ﬁnancial resources to the development of new technologies (RD&D: stage 1)
and  infrastructure development (stage 2) in order to stimulate the adoption of a more sustainable
technology by consumers (stage 3). The literature illustrates that this allocation decision is not trivial.
Regarding the ﬁrst stage, the literature suggests that more variety creation is better because sub-
sequent support leads to better outcomes when there is greater variety, as more variety leaves open
more  future options and leads to an increased probability of successful recombination and spillovers
(Fisher, 1930; Metcalfe, 1994; van den Bergh, 2008; Zeppini and van den Bergh, 2011). The effects
of  increased variety in the next stage, where some technologies receive support for infrastructure
development, are less clear. On the one hand, variety compensates for the uncertainty associated with
the  (future) performance of each technological option (Alkemade et al., 2009). On the other hand, as
infrastructure-dependent vehicle technologies are characterized by increasing returns to scale, there
are  costs associated with maintaining diversity in this stage. In a model of optimizing the beneﬁts and
costs  of diversity, van den Bergh (2008) ﬁnds that under increasing returns to scale, diversity is only
attractive when the payoffs of diversity are sufﬁciently large. Other arguments, why increased variety
in  this stage might decrease the probability of overcoming lock-in, can be found in the increased level
of  competition between the alternative technological options, the increased level of uncertainty for
consumers and the decreased probability of establishing a new technological standard. With regard
to  the level of competition moderate competition is considered to improve the chances of overcoming
lock-in as rivalry among technologies gives incentives to further improve the technology (Gruber and
Verboven,  2001; Koski and Kretschmer, 2004, 2005). Fierce competition among a large number of
competing alternatives can slow consumer adoption of the new technology as it leads to increased
consumer uncertainty. This uncertainty may  cause consumers to postpone their adoption decision
because of the risk of selecting a technology that fails to generate network externalities and loses
the  competition (Geroski, 2000). While moderate variety thus seems beneﬁcial in the ﬁrst stage, the
adequate  level of variety is less clear in subsequent stages. As public ﬁnancial resources are limited
and the uncertainty regarding future technological performance is high, deciding on how to allocate
resources between the different stages is complex. In the next section we  present a model that allows
us  to explore this resource allocation problem.
3. A model of technological substitution
The general structure of our model in Fig. 1 shows that policymakers intervene by allocating ﬁnan-
cial  resources to stage 1 and stage 2. Budget allocation to public support for RD&D (B1) results in
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1. New infrastructure-dependent 
vehicle technologies
characteristics• 
price• 
2. New technology-specific 
infrastructure
infrastructure availability• 
3. Consumer adoption
preferences for characteristics• 
budget• 
infrastructure requirements• 
Allocation of 
public financial 
resources
B1
B2 =  B - B1
Fig. 1. Structure of the model.
the creation of technological variety. The technological options differ in initial price and performance
on the technological characteristics. Budget allocation to stage 2 (B2) leads to technology-speciﬁc
infrastructure development for the newly created technological options. In stage 3 consumer adop-
tion  determines if the locked-in technology will be replaced by one of the new technologies, that is if
technological substitution occurs. Below a more elaborate description of the model is given.
The model starts from a situation of lock-in into a single technological option, labeled as the incum-
bent technology. We  deﬁne lock-in as the situation where the incumbent technology is adopted by at
least  90% of the consumers. We  run the model to analyze the effects of different allocations of ﬁnancial
resources to stage 1 and stage 2. The budget allocated to the ﬁrst stage (B1) depends on the technologi-
cal variety, that is the number of technological options (I1) that receive RD&D support, times the costs
of  RD&D support per technological option (c). The budget allocation B2 = B − B1 to the second stage
determines how much support for infrastructure development the technological options (I2) that are
selected  for infrastructure support receive. The I2 technological options that receive infrastructure
support are selected randomly, reﬂecting that it is difﬁcult for policymakers to evaluate the perfor-
mance of each technological option before it is actually on the market. Vehicle technologies that do
not  receive support will not enter the market and are therefore not available for consumer adoption
in  stage 3.
In  the third and ﬁnal stage, the infrastructure-dependent vehicle technologies compete for market
share with the incumbent and locked-in technology as well as with each other. The number of con-
sumers that adopt a certain technology determines the market share of that technology. Consumers
base their adoption decision on the availability of infrastructure and on the degree to which a tech-
nology ﬁts their individual preferences and budget. The remainder of this section gives a detailed
description of the model components (technologies, infrastructure and consumers) and their interac-
tions.
3.1.  Technologies
In  the model, a technology i is described by its performance on a set of characteristics Xi ∈ [0, 1], as in
Lancaster (1971) and Saviotti (1996), and by its price P. Not all characteristics are considered equally
important and the way the different characteristics are valued can change over time. Furthermore
new characteristics such as environmental performance can become important. These changes in the
selection  environment are an important driver of technological change (Dosi, 1982).
The current dominant design shows a high performance on the characteristics that are ‘tradition-
ally’ considered important by consumers as it has co-evolved with, and thus has become adapted to,
its  selection environment. Fossil fuel-based internal combustion engine vehicles, for example, show
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Fig. 2. The initial performance of technologies in a traditional and a environmental performance dimension.
a high performance on ‘traditional’ characteristics such as driving range and maximum speed. When
technology-push or demand-pull factors change the selection environment, consumers may  take into
account  a different set of characteristics in their adoption decision. In the case of vehicle technologies
environmental performance characteristics like fuel consumption and CO2 emissions have recently
gained importance due to concerns about climate change. New technological options, such as electric
vehicles, perform better on these newly evaluated environmental performance characteristics than
the  incumbent technology, possibly leading to an increase of consumer adoption of the new tech-
nologies. This is not necessarily the case however, as incremental innovation may  also improve the
environmental performance of the incumbent technology.
We  model this process in the following way: we  assume that the emergence of new technological
options in stage 1 expands the set of characteristics that consumers consider in their adoption decision.
Thus,  consumers do not only evaluate the traditional performance characteristics but also take into
account  the environmental performance characteristics of a technology, although not all consumers
will consider environmental performance characteristics important in comparison with the traditional
characteristics. On average, new technologies are assumed to initially show a better performance on
these  newly considered environmental performance characteristics than the incumbent one, but a
worse  performance on the traditional characteristics.
Fig. 2 shows the initial performance of vehicle technologies in two  performance dimensions, a
‘traditional’ and an ‘environmental’ dimension. The performance of technologies on each of the char-
acteristics is valued between 0 and 1. The incumbent technology performs high on the ‘traditional’
characteristic but low on the ‘environmental’ characteristic. On average, the emerging technologies
perform higher on the ‘environmental’ characteristic but lower on the ‘traditional’ characteristic than
the  incumbent technology. The initial performance is drawn randomly from a normal distribution
with mean t or e. For incumbent technologies t = t2 on the traditional characteristic and e = e2 on the
environmental characteristic. For the new technologies t = t1 on traditional characteristics and e = e1
on the environmental characteristic. As can be seen in Fig. 2 technologies are initialized with t1 < t2 and
e2 < e1. The emerging technologies do not have the same performance on the different characteristics.
Stirling (2007, 2011) identiﬁes balance and disparity as important aspects of diversity in addition to
variety.  Variety refers to the number of different technological options, while balance describes the
relative  shares of each of the technological options. Disparity denotes how different the options are
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from each other. The average technological distance between the emerging technologies is higher for
a  higher disparity, which is the modelled as the variance of t1 and e1.
Upon market entry, the price of newly created technologies is assumed to be higher than the price
of  the incumbent technology. The initial price of new technologies Pi0 is equal to the initial price of
the  incumbent technology plus a random premium .1
3.2. Infrastructures
Infrastructure-dependent vehicle technologies depend on the availability of a speciﬁc infrastruc-
ture, such as refuelling or recharging infrastructure, and consumers consider the availability of this
infrastructure in their adoption decision. Infrastructure is technology-speciﬁc in the model presented
here  meaning that there is no compatibility between technology x and the infrastructure for technol-
ogy  y. The initial infrastructure availability for a technology is determined by the budget allocated by
the  policymaker to infrastructure development (B2). This budget is equally divided among the selected
technologies I2. The initial infrastructure availability Ai(0) of technology i is given by the following equa-
tion  where  represents the factor between ﬁnancial resources and infrastructure availability and 
represents  initial investments in infrastructure availability by private ﬁrms:
Ai(0) =  ×
(
B2
I2
)
+ . (1)
3.3. Consumers
The consumers in the model will adopt a technology that meets all their requirements. Consumers
are myopic and do not take into account the positive and negative consequences of their behavior, but
base  their decisions solely on past events and have no expectations about the future (Arthur, 1989).
Consumers are characterized by ﬁxed budget constraint m and infrastructure availability requirements
a.  Furthermore, consumers are heterogeneous and have different weights for the performance of the
characteristics of a technology x ∈ X. A consumer’s budget constraint m and infrastructure availability
requirements a are drawn randomly from a normal distribution. The performance of a technology
is valued in relation to the technological frontier. The maximum observed performance xmax on a
characteristic x, over all technologies, is taken as a benchmark for that characteristic. The individual
consumer weights ϕ for each characteristic x are drawn from a normal distribution with a mean equal to
this  benchmark xmax: ϕ∼N
(
xmax, 2
)
. When the performance of the available technologies on a certain
characteristic increases, the consumer weights for the performance on that characteristic increase as
well,  representing a technology-push mechanism. Consumer choice depends on how a consumer
weighs the performance and the price of the technologies, and on the infrastructure availability for
that  technology. The decision making process is described in more detail below:
1. Adoption decision: The probability that a consumer reconsiders his previous adoption decision and
seeks to purchase a new vehicle is ω in each time step, where ω is the average replacement rate.
When the consumer adopts a new vehicle, his current vehicle is replaced by either a new vehi-
cle technology or the same vehicle technology as before, which might have improved on some
characteristics.
2. Determine weights for characteristics: The consumer updates his weights for the technology charac-
teristics given the current state of the technological frontier as described above.
3.  Identify affordable technologies: A consumer only considers adopting a technology when the current
price of that technology is within his budget constraint.
4. Assess infrastructure availability: A consumer only considers adopting a technology when the current
availability of infrastructure for that technology satisﬁes his infrastructure requirements.
5.  Determine utility: For those technologies that fulﬁll all requirements, the utility the consumer derives
from the performance characteristics of that technology is calculated. Utility Ui is the utility of
1 For the initial price of the incumbent technology, see Appendix A.
A. van der Vooren et al. / Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions 2 (2012) 98– 117 105
consuming the set of characteristics Xi of a technology i (Windrum and Birchenhall, 2005; Lancaster,
1971). A simple Cobb–Douglas utility function determines the utility of each technology for an
individual consumer:
U  = xϕ11 xϕ22 (2)
6. Select and adopt technology: Finally, the consumer weighs the utility and price of the technologies
taken  into consideration. When multiple options are considered the consumer adopts the tech-
nology with the highest utility/price ratio: Ui/P(ϕ1+ϕ2)i . The adoption decision of a consumer thus
consists  of both hard constraints (1, 3 and 4) and soft constraints (2, 5 and 6).
The  interactions of the different model components determine the dynamics of the model and are
discussed below. The characteristics, prices and infrastructure availability of infrastructure-dependent
vehicle technologies change over time.
3.4. Technology dynamics
When  new technologies such as low emission vehicles enter the market this can be considered
a radical innovation. After market introduction these new technologies continue to evolve due to
incremental innovation and learning effects. Incremental innovation in a technology occurs when the
performance of that technology on one of its technological characteristics increases. This improves
the competitive position of that technology and results in an increase of the number of adopters
when the direction of technological change aligns with consumer preferences. Technological progress
due  to incremental innovation is modelled as a stochastic process in order to capture the inherent
uncertainty of R&D as in Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Malerba and Orsenigo (2002). Each time step
of  the model innovation can only occur in one characteristic of a technology, representing a focus of the
ﬁrm’s  innovation efforts (Moore, 1965; Nagy et al., 2011). Furthermore, innovation is path-dependent
(David, 1985); once a ﬁrm has built up substantial technological capabilities in engine efﬁciency,
additional R&D efforts in this area are more likely to lead to successful innovation than R&D efforts
in  areas where the ﬁrm has no prior experience. Performance increases in a certain characteristic are
thus  more likely if the ﬁrm’s previous innovation efforts have focused on this characteristic.
This is modelled as follows: the probability that characteristic x ∈ Xi of technology i is selected for
innovation is equal to the cumulative number of innovations in characteristic x of technology i divided
by  the cumulative number of innovations in all characteristics of the technology i (Cumxi/Cumi). The
state  of a characteristic after incremental innovation is given by Eq. (3), where  is the incremental
innovation rate.2 The effects of incremental innovation are large at ﬁrst, but the effects of subse-
quent incremental innovations in a characteristic diminish over time as in a standard learning curve
(Junginger et al., 2005, 2006).
xi(t+1) = xi(t) (3)
Besides changes in the characteristics of a technology, the price of a technology can also change
over time. The price of a technology decreases over time due to scale economies, learning by doing
and  R&D (Wright, 1936; Ferioli et al., 2009). An increase in the consumer adoption of a technology
causes a decline in a technology’s purchase price (Mansﬁeld, 1988; Arrow, 1962). The effects of a price
decrease on consumer adoption are twofold: ﬁrst, a price decrease makes the technology affordable to
a  larger group of consumers. Second, it increases the utility/price ratio of that technology. Both effects
may  lead to increased adoption. This relationship between price and the number of adopters is given
by  a standard learning-curve as in Cantono and Silverberg (2009):
Pi(t) = Pi(0) ·
(
ci(0)
ci(t)
)˛
, (4)
2 Incremental innovation can be unsuccessful if ( > 1). In this case the incremental change is not adopted and the state of
the characteristic remains unaltered.
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where Pi(t) is the price of technology i at time t, Pi(0) the initial price of the technology, ci(0) the initial
number of consumers, ci(t) the cumulative number of consumers of a technology and  ˛ the learning
ability of a technology.
3.5.  Infrastructure dynamics
Infrastructure  co-develops with the size of the adopter group, due to indirect network externalities.
On the one hand, an increase in infrastructure availability can enlarge the group of potential adopters,
because more consumers will take the technology into consideration. On the other hand, an increase
in  the number of adopters of a technology leads to a higher availability of the infrastructure(s) for
that  technology because this attracts investors (Grübler, 1990). For example, low emission vehicles,
such  as battery electric vehicles, become more attractive when the availability of recharging points
increase and an increase in battery electric vehicles will attract more investors in recharging points.
Infrastructure availability Ai is described by Eq. (5):
Ai(t) = max(Ai(t−1), Ai(0) + Si(t)), (5)
where Ai(0) is the infrastructure availability at the time of emergence, Si(t) is the market share of
technology i which is equal to the number of consumers that possess technology i at time t divided by
the  total number of consumers N.
4. Simulation settings and results
The simulation model is used to analyze how the allocation of public budget to the stages of public
RD&D support and support for infrastructure development affects the technological substitution pro-
cess.  The model is run for different conditions by varying three independent parameters: total budget,
RD&D  costs per technological option, and disparity. The total budget B that can be allocated to pub-
lic  RD&D support and infrastructure development is ﬁxed at 1 in the simulations. Thus, an increase
in  budget allocated to public RD&D support (B1) corresponds with a decrease of the budget that is
available to support the infrastructure development (B2) of the emerging technologies. Since, the bal-
ance  between costs of RD&D and infrastructure development is not trivial, this section presents the
probability of technological substitution for different RD&D costs per technological option: zero (0),
low  (1/30), medium (1/15) or high (1/10). These different cost levels allow us to explore scenarios
where the relative balance between the costs of RD&D and infrastructure development differs. More-
over,  these parameter settings allow both for conditions where there is ample support for RD&D and
infrastructure development and conditions where the budget is limited due to high costs of RD&D
per  technological option. When the RD&D costs per technological option are high (1/10), allocating
the complete budget to public RD&D support results in the creation of ten technological options;
however no budget will be left to support the infrastructure development of these ten technological
options. Allocating the complete budget towards the infrastructure development of a single techno-
logical option results in the development of around 30% of the infrastructure for that technological
option (see Eq. (1)). The literature suggests that an initial infrastructure availability between 15 and
20%  is sufﬁcient for the wide spread diffusion of vehicle technologies (Melaina, 2003; Melaina and
Bremson, 2003; Huétink et al., 2010). The exact level of infrastructure development that is sufﬁcient
for  consumer adoption also depends on the technological characteristics of the vehicle, such as the
range,  and may  thus be different for different technological options, more empirical research is needed
here.
Disparity refers to the initial technological distance between the new technological options (see
Section 3). Disparity is modelled by changing the variance 2 of the normal distribution function that
sets  the initial performance of the emerging technologies and can be zero (0), low (0.02), medium (0.04)
or  high (0.06). The average technological distance between the emerging technologies is higher for a
higher  disparity. The probability of technological substitution is expected to increase for a higher dis-
parity,  because in this case the technologies cover a wider area of the so-called search space (Frenken,
2006; Silverberg and Verspagen, 2007).
A. van der Vooren et al. / Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions 2 (2012) 98– 117 107
Table  1
Overview of all possible allocations of budget to RD&D support and infrastructure development up to ten technological options
for the case of high RD&D costs per technological option (1/10). The table shows the support for infrastructure development
that  each selected technology receives.
Number of technologies with
RD&D support (stage 1)
Number of technologies with infrastructure development support (stage 2)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 0.90
2 0.80  0.40
3  0.70 0.35 0.23
4 0.60  0.30 0.20 0.15
5 0.50 0.25 0.17 0.13 0.10
6 0.40  0.20 0.13 0.10 0.08 0.07
7 0.30 0.15 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.04
8 0.20  0.10 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03
9  0.10 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Fig. 3. Typical runs of successful technological substitution (left) and failed technological substitution (right).
Table 1 gives an overview of all possible allocations of public budget to RD&D support and infras-
tructure development up to ten technological options for the case of high RD&D costs per technological
option (1/10). As an example, the table shows that RD&D support for two  technologies leaves a budget
of  0.8 (1 − 2 × 1/10) to support the infrastructure development of these technologies. Policymakers
can spend this budget either on the infrastructure development of both technologies (0.4 support
per technology) or on the infrastructure development of one of these technologies (0.8 support). 100
model  runs are simulated for each of the 55 possible allocations for 16 different conditions formed by
the  different disparity levels and RD&D costs per technological option.3
For each allocation the probability of technological substitution is calculated, that is the percentage
of simulation runs in which substitution of the incumbent technology by a new technology took
place within 100 time steps. More speciﬁcally, technological substitution occurs when one of the new
technologies obtains a higher market share than the incumbent technology at that time. So, if the
incumbent technology is replaced by an alternative technology in 10 out of the 100 simulation runs
for  a particular allocation, the probability of technological substitution is 0.10. Fig. 3 shows two  typical
runs,  of a successful and a failed technological substitution process respectively.
Fig. 3 shows the emergence of three alternative technologies at time step zero, when there is lock-
in  into the incumbent technology. The graph on the left of Fig. 3 illustrates a simulation run where
one of the alternatives becomes the dominant technology after 59 time steps, indicating successful
3 The total number of simulation runs is 88.000 (55 possible allocations × 16 (4 × 4) different conditions × 100 runs.
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Fig. 4. The relationship between the RD&D costs per technological option and the probability of technological substitution for
different levels of disparity.
technological substitution. The graph on the right of Fig. 3 illustrates a simulation run where none of
the  alternatives succeeded in replacing the incumbent technology as the dominant technology. Failed
technological substitution may  be due to, for example, sailing ship effects of the incumbent technology,
bad  technological performance and development of the alternative technologies, insufﬁcient support
for  infrastructure development of these alternatives, or too much competition among the alternatives.
A  more elaborate analysis of the simulation outcomes at the level of single simulation runs in the
context of sustainability transitions is presented in Section 5. This section proceeds with presenting
the aggregate outcomes of the simulations.
Fig. 4 ﬁrst shows the effects of the different parameters on the technological substitution process.
The ﬁgure illustrates the relation between the RD&D costs per technological option and the probability
of  technological substitution for different levels of disparity. As expected, the ﬁgure shows a negative
relation between the RD&D costs per technological option and the probability of technological sub-
stitution, because less budget is available to support the infrastructure development when the RD&D
costs  increase. The effects are highest for a high disparity level. Moreover, an increase in disparity
results in a higher probability of technological substitution, as the technologies cover a wider area of
the  search space and the probability that one of the new options shows high performance increases.
In  summary, the highest probability of technological substitution occurs under conditions of low
RD&D  costs per technological option and high disparity. Below, the effects of different allocations of
public  ﬁnancial resources on the probability of technological substitution are analyzed. First, the effect
of  resource allocation to public support for RD&D is presented, followed by analyses of the effect of
resource  allocation to public support for infrastructure development, and the trade-off between the
allocation  of ﬁnancial resources to support for RD&D and infrastructure development.
4.1. The effects of public support for RD&D
Fig. 5 shows the relationship between public support for RD&D and the probability of technological
substitution for the different disparity levels. The RD&D costs per technological option increase from
zero  (graph A) to high (graph D). The x-axis indicates the number of technologies with RD&D support in
this  ﬁrst stage. For each number of technological options with RD&D support, the average probability
of  technological substitution is calculated over all possible allocations.4
4 For example, when three technological options receive RD&D support it is possible to support one, two or three of these
technologies for infrastructure development. In this case averages are calculated over these three allocation possibilities.
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Fig. 5. The relation between public support for RD&D and the probability of technological substitution for the different disparity
levels. The RD&D costs per technological option are zero (graph A), low (graph B), medium (graph C) and high (graph D).
Fig. 5 illustrates the trade-off for the policymaker related to the optimal level of RD&D support.
First, when RD&D comes at no costs (graph A), there is a positive relation between the number of
technologies with RD&D support and the probability of technological substitution for medium and high
disparity  levels, but not for lower disparity levels. When more technologies receive RD&D support the
probability that a high performing technology is among them increases immediately and in the long
run.  These positive effects of public RD&D support are largest when disparity is high. When disparity is
zero,  the supported technological options initially perform similar on the technological characteristics,
therefore the beneﬁts of supporting an extra technology with infrastructure development are small.
Second,  when the RD&D costs per technological option are greater than zero there are decreas-
ing returns of public support for RD&D, illustrated in graph B (low costs), C (medium costs) and D
(high  costs). Graph D illustrates that support of technological options for RD&D only leads to a high
probability of technological substitution when enough budget remains to support the infrastructure
development of these technological options in stage 2 as well (e.g., at low levels of public support for
RD&D).  From graph B to graph D the optimal number of technologies with RD&D support shifts to
the  left for all disparity levels due to the increase in RD&D costs. Moreover, the decreasing returns
of public support for RD&D are higher when the RD&D costs increase. This indicates that in domains
that need large infrastructural investments, such as mobility technologies, public support for RD&D
by  itself is not sufﬁcient to realize a transition. In the model, the best balance between public support
for  RD&D and infrastructure development is found at rather low levels of public support for RD&D.
A  ﬁnal outcome of the simulations is that public support for RD&D is more beneﬁcial if the new
technologies are sufﬁciently different (high disparity). Graph B illustrates that the optimal number of
technologies with RD&D support decreases for lower levels of disparity. Similar patterns are observed
in  graph C and D. This indicates that the policymaker should take into account the technological
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Fig. 6. The relation between public support for infrastructure development and the probability of technological substitution
for  the different disparity levels. The RD&D costs per technological option are zero (graph A), low (graph B), medium (graph C)
and high (graph D).
characteristics of the different alternatives, adding a technology-speciﬁc element to the decision. For
example,  support of fuel cell vehicles and vehicles on biogas is expected to be more beneﬁcial than
support of vehicles on natural gas and vehicles on biogas, because the technological difference between
fuel  cell vehicles and vehicles on biogas is higher than the technological difference between vehicles
on  biogas and natural gas.
4.2. The effects of public support for infrastructure development
Fig.  6 shows the relationship between public support for infrastructure development and the prob-
ability  of technological substitution for the different disparity levels. Similar to Fig. 5 the RD&D costs
per  technological option increase from zero to high for graph A to D. The x-axis indicates the number
of  technologies that also receive support for infrastructure development. For each level of support for
infrastructure development, the average probability of technological substitution is calculated over
all  possible allocations.
Fig.  6 illustrates several trade-offs the policymaker is faced with. First, when disparity is zero, a
negative relation between the number of technologies with support for infrastructure development
and the probability of technological substitution is observed. Since the initial technological perfor-
mance of the different technological options is equal when disparity is zero, the beneﬁts of supporting
multiple technologies are low. In this case the highest probability of technological substitution occurs
when  the complete budget is allocated to the support of a single technological option. This negative
relation between the number of technologies with support for infrastructure development and the
probability of technological substitution holds for all cases where disparity is zero, independent of the
RD&D  costs per technological option (see graphs B, C and D).
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Second, when disparity is medium or high it is beneﬁcial to support different technological options.
However, there is a minimum size of the support that is needed for that support to have an effect.
At  some point the probability of technological substitution decreases again when more technologies
are supported due to the division of the budget over more technologies. When more technologies are
supported it is more difﬁcult for each individual technology to realize increasing returns to adoption.
The  ﬁgure illustrates that the optimal number of technologies with support for infrastructure devel-
opment also depends on the RD&D costs. For example, when disparity is high and support for RD&D
comes at no costs, the optimal number of technologies with support for infrastructure development
is at least ten (graph A). The optimal level decreases when the RD&D costs increase. The optimal level
occurs  at six supported technologies for low RD&D costs (graph B), four supported technologies for
medium  RD&D costs (graph C), and three supported technologies for high RD&D costs (graph D). In
summary, when the RD&D costs per technological option increase the optimal number of technologies
with support for infrastructure development decreases.
4.3.  The trade-off between public support for RD&D and infrastructure development
Fig. 7 illustrates the trade-off between public support for RD&D and infrastructure development
and provides insight into the effects of resource allocation. At the top row of Fig. 7, the disparity
level is low, whereas the bottom row shows the probability of technological substitution for medium
disparity. The graphs on the left show the probability of technological substitution for low RD&D costs
per  technological option, while the RD&D costs are medium for the graphs at the right-hand side. Each
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Fig. 7. The relation between the number of supported technologies and the probability of technological substitution in stages 1
and 2. For different RD&D costs and different disparity levels: low RD&D costs (left), medium RD&D costs (right), low disparity
(top) and medium disparity (bottom).
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graph presents the probability of technological substitution for both the number of technologies with
support  for RD&D and the number of technologies with support for infrastructure development.
The effects of RD&D costs per technological option and disparity on the optimal number of tech-
nologies with RD&D and infrastructure development support have been discussed above. Fig. 7 shows
that  in our simulations the optimal number of technologies with RD&D support is similar to the opti-
mal  number of technologies with infrastructure support. This means that it is optimal to support also
the  infrastructure development of these technologies that received RD&D support. In other words, a
policymaker should not support more technological options with RD&D than can be supported for
infrastructure development. This observation seems to be independent of the RD&D costs and the
disparity level. The explanation for these results can be found in the decision making process of the
policymaker. It is assumed in this paper that policymakers are not capable picking winners, that is,
it  is very difﬁcult to determine ex ante which technologies will be most successful. This is modelled
as random selection of the technologies that are supported with infrastructure development. This
decision making process is further explored below.
4.4. Informed decision making
Fig.  8 presents the trade-off between public support for RD&D and infrastructure development
for the case that policymakers do have the capability to assess the performance of the new techno-
logical options. Here it is assumed that policymakers can perfectly assess the initial performance of
the  technologies that received support for RD&D in stage 1, that is, they can adequately observe and
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Fig. 8. The relation between the number of supported technologies and the probability of technological substitution in stage
1 and stage 2 with informed decision making. For different RD&D costs and different disparity levels: low RD&D costs (left),
medium RD&D costs (right), low disparity (top) and medium disparity (bottom).
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interpret the outcomes of RD&D and pilot projects when deciding upon large scale support for infras-
tructure development in stage 2. This is modelled by supporting the infrastructure development of
those  technologies with the highest initial quality/price ratio.5
A comparison of Fig. 8 with Fig. 7 illustrates the effects when the policymaker is capable of choosing
the most promising technological options. The optimal number of technologies with RD&D support
shifts  to the right when policymakers can make an informed rather than random decision over which
technologies to support. So, it is beneﬁcial to support more technological options in the RD&D stage
when  a policymaker can evaluate the performance of these options. Informed decision making thus
increases the beneﬁts of allocating ﬁnancial resources to RD&D support. Furthermore, the relation
between the number of technologies with support for infrastructure development and the probability
of  technological substitution is negative, so that supporting one technological option for infrastructure
development is most beneﬁcial. Since, a policymaker can pick the most promising option it pays to
invest  in this option. However, when the disparity level increases (from low disparity in Fig. 8A and
B  to medium disparity in Fig. 8C and D), it becomes more attractive to support the second and third
most  promising option as well. There is thus a clear beneﬁt from increased information regarding the
technological characteristics and performance of the different technological options.
In sum, for an informed policymaker, the best allocation saves budget for infrastructure develop-
ment for the most promising technology while the remainder of the budget is spent on the creation
of  technological alternatives (RD&D support).
5. Analysis of results in a sustainability transitions context
From  the perspective of sustainability transitions, technological substitution is neither a sufﬁ-
cient nor a necessary condition for a transition to occur, as new technologies might perform worse
in  terms of environmental indicators than the incumbent technology. Furthermore a sustainability
transition can also occur when the incumbent remains dominant but becomes more sustainable. A
sustainability transition can thus be realized in different ways. Geels and Schot (2007) have provided a
typology  of so-called transition pathways, distinguishing four different pathways: transformation, de-
alignment/re-alignment, technological substitution and reconﬁguration. These pathways differ with
respect  to the timing and the nature of the interactions between the different actors involved. The
model  simulations presented in this paper started from a situation of lock-in into an incumbent
technology. At time 0, the time of emergence of different alternatives, consumers start taking the
environmental performance characteristic into account. The incumbent technology scores better on
the  traditional characteristic whereas the emerging technologies score better on the environmen-
tal performance characteristic. A sample of all simulations runs is taken to study the development
of the technological characteristics.6 Fig. 9 illustrates three typical patterns. In each graph the solid
line  depicts the market share of the incumbent technology. The dashed lines depict the average per-
formance on the different characteristics weighted by the numbers of adopters of each technology.
At the start of the simulations the incumbent technology dominates the market, which causes that
the  average performance, weighted over all technologies, on the environmental characteristic is very
low  in comparison to the average performance, weighted over all technologies, on the traditional
characteristic.
Fig. 9A presents the case where no technological substitution and no transition takes place. This
pathway in which the incumbent technology does not lose any market share and shows accumulated
incremental innovations in the traditional characteristic is observed in 37.6% of the sample simulation
runs and corresponds to what Geels and Schot (2007) label as the reproduction process.
Fig. 9B represents the case with both technological substitution and a transition. The model out-
come is considered as a sustainability transition when the average performance on the environmental
characteristic substantially improves and is at least as good as the initial performance of the incumbent
5 (x1x2)/P.
6 For each of the 880 experiments (55 allocations, 16 different parameter settings) a single run was  randomly selected
(out  of the 100 simulation runs).
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Fig. 9. Transition pathways: the solid line in each graph presents the market share of the incumbent technology over time,
which determines whether or not technological substitution occurred. The dashed lines show the average performance on
the traditional and environmental characteristic weighted over all adopted technologies, which determines whether or not a
sustainability transition occurred.
technology on the traditional characteristic (see Appendix A). Technological substitution is observed
in  36.3% of the sample simulation runs and in 64.9% of these it is accompanied with a transition. The
performance on the environmental characteristic improves over time and the new dominant technol-
ogy  is more sustainable than the previous incumbent technology. At the same time, a slight decline
of  the performance on traditional characteristics is observed, as the substituting technology is not yet
completely developed on these characteristics. Geels and Schot (2007) label this type of transition
pathway de-alignment and re-alignment followed by technological substitution.
Fig. 9C again shows an example of a simulation where no technological substitution takes place.
Nevertheless, it shows a considerable improvement in the environmental performance characteristic.
This pathway is observed in 26.1% of the sample simulation runs and corresponds to the transformation
pathway, “the regime actors respond to landscape pressure by modifying the direction of development and
innovation  activities” (Geels and Schot, 2007). The alternative technologies cannot take advantage of
this  pressure because they are not yet sufﬁciently developed. One might also link such a transition to
the  reconﬁguration pathway in which the new regime also grows out of the old regime, only here the
regime’s basic architecture changes as is often the case for sociotechnical systems.
6. Conclusions and policy implications
In this paper, we have presented a model of technological substitution focused on infrastructure-
dependent vehicle technologies. The focus was on how the allocation of public ﬁnancial resources
to public support for RD&D and infrastructure development affects the replacement of a locked-in
technology by a new technology. Although consumers in our model eventually determine which
technology will be successful, policymakers can affect the probability (and speed) of the technological
substitution process. We  have analyzed the effects of resource allocation to these stages by performing
numerical simulations. More speciﬁcally, the simulations provided insight into the trade-off between
the  allocation of a limited budget towards the creation of new technological options by supporting
RD&D on the one hand, and the support for infrastructure development of these technologies on the
other  hand. The results of our model indicate that for infrastructure-dependent vehicle technologies,
an increase in public support for RD&D does not necessarily lead to a higher probability of technolog-
ical substitution (or a transition). Supporting the RD&D for different technological options is usually
costly, and these costs should only be made under conditions where it is possible to beneﬁt from
the  increased technological variety. According to the model analysis, support for RD&D of different
technologies is most useful when it meets three conditions: ﬁrst, the supported technological options
should  be sufﬁciently different with respect to their technological performance in order to cover a
wider  area of the so-called search space. The analysis of the results show that such disparity increases
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the probability that a technological option will be developed that successfully competes with the
incumbent technology.
A  second ﬁnding is that policymakers should allocate substantial ﬁnancial resources to the pub-
lic  support for infrastructure development of the infrastructure-dependent vehicle technologies. So,
public  support for RD&D in stage 1 is only rewarding when each of the created technologies is also
substantially supported for infrastructure development in stage 2. The results illustrate that support-
ing  many different technologies, each with a modest support for infrastructure development makes
it  difﬁcult for any individual vehicle technology to realize increasing returns to scale.
A third important insight is that if policymakers are able to adequately evaluate the different
technological options supported in stage 1, and because of that are able to pick the most promis-
ing options for support of their infrastructure development, then the policymaker can reduce the
number of technological options with support for infrastructure development and increase the num-
ber  of options with RD&D support. As uncertainty is inherent to the development of new technologies,
this knowledge is usually not available.
The foregoing conclusions only hold when there is a strict dependency of vehicle technologies on
the  availability of a particular physical infrastructure. Policies aiming at the technological substitu-
tion of infrastructure-dependent vehicle technologies should include all stages of the technological
substitution process as well as a clear prescription of how results from early stages feed forward into
later  stages.
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Appendix A.
Parameter values.a
Parameter Interpretation Values
Stages
B Total budget for policy intervention 0.3
B1 Budget allocated to variety creation (stage 1) <B
B2 Budget allocated to selection (stage 2) B − B1
I1 Number of created technologies in stage 1 ≤B/c
I2 Number of selected technologies in stage 2 ≤I1
c Costs of variety creation ∈[0, 0.03]
Consumers
N  Number of consumers 1.000
ϕx Consumer weights for characteristic x ∼N(xmax , 0.1)
m  Budget constraint ∼N(0.4, 0.1)
a  Infrastructure availability requirement ∼N(0.4, 0.2)
ω  Replacement rate 1/3
Ui Utility of consuming the set of characteristics of technology i ∈[0, 1]
Technologies
Xi Set of service characteristic x of technology i ∈[0, 1]
x  Performance of characteristics ∈[0, 1]
xmax Maximum observed performance on a characteristic x ∈[0, 1]
i  Index for technologies
Ai Infrastructure availability for technology i ∈[0, 1]
  Factor between ﬁnancial resources and infrastructure development 1/3
 Incremental innovation rate ∈[0.97, 1.02]
˛  Learning ability 0.05
Pi Price of technology i ∈[0, 0.5]
ci(t) Cumulative number of adopters at time step t
Si(t) Market share of technology i at time t ∈[0, 1]
Cumxi Cumulative number of innovations in characteristic of x of the technology i
Cumi Cumulative number of innovations in all characteristics of the technology i
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Incumbent technology
xe(0) Initial performance of environmental characteristic ∼N(e1, 0)
xt(0) Initial performance of traditional characteristic ∼N(t3, 0)
e2 Mean of initial performance of environmental characteristic 0.05
t3 Mean of initial performance of traditional characteristic 0.2
ci(0) Initial number of cumulative adopters 900b
P(0) Initial price of incumbent technology 0.2
Emerging  technologies
xe(0) Initial performance of environmental characteristic ∼N(e2, 2)
xt(0) Initial performance of traditional characteristic ∼N(t2, 2)
e1 Mean of initial performance of environmental characteristic 0.1
t1 Mean of initial performance of traditional characteristic 0.1
2 Disparity: variance of initial performance of characteristics ∈[0, 0.06]
ci0 Initial number of cumulative adopters 1
 Random premium (price) ∈[0.025, 0.125]
  Initial infrastructure investment by private ﬁrms 0.04
a The source code of the NetLogo (Wilensky, 1999) simulation model is available from the authors upon request.
b Lock-in is deﬁned as the situation where the incumbent technology is adopted by 90% of the consumers.
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